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We  extend  the  differentiated  product  model,  ﬁrst  developed  by
Bowley  (1924),  by relaxing  the assumption  that  each  ﬁrm  produces
only  one  differentiated  product.  By doing so,  we  are  able  to ana-
lyze  the  potential  for collusive  market  segmentation  in a two-stage
decision framework,  ﬁrst  in product  space  and  second  in output.  We
ﬁnd  that  when  ﬁrms  cannot  coordinate  on  output,  the  required  dis-
count  factor  that  supports  collusive  market  segmentation  is  strictly
decreasing  in  product  substitutability  and  is  greater  than partial
output  and full  collusion.  Overall  we  ﬁnd  that  output  collusion  alone
is  easier  to sustain  than  collusive  product  market  segmentation.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  This  is  an  open
access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Product differentiation and market segmentation have long been recognized as important strategic
choices by ﬁrms (Smith, 1956). Firms may  strategically differentiate their product(s) by brand and/or
quality attributes to uniquely position their product(s) with consumers. Market segmentation is the
strategy of choosing which products to produce from a ﬁnite set of existing or potential product(s).
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United States and European courts and antitrust authorities have long recognized the potential
reduction in competition from tacit or overt horizontal agreements to allocate consumers, products
and/or geographic territories (Belleﬂamme & Bloch, 2004; Sullivan & Grimes, 2000). Welfare reducing
collusion in regards to product space entails an agreement that ‘you produce product A while I pro-
duce product B’ when independent and competitive decisions would dictate both ﬁrms produce both
products.
The ability of ﬁrms to tacitly collude in restricting output or raising prices in repeated games is
signiﬁcantly impacted by the differentiability of the ﬁrms’ product(s) (e.g. Chang, 1991; Häckner, 1994;
Ross, 1992; Singh & Vives, 1984). To date, the differentiated products literature has largely focused on
collusive output/pricing decisions rather than also addressing collusive multiproduct (conglomerate)
decisions. There is a limited literature that addresses the collusive potential among multiproduct
(conglomerate) ﬁrms, each tackling the problem from different directions (i.e. Bernheim & Winston,
1990; Symeonidis, 2002).2 An even smaller amount of literature has considered ﬁrm decisions as a
two-stage game, ﬁrst in product space and second in price (Dobson & Waterson, 1996; Shaked &
Sutton, 1990) or second in quantity (Fraja, 1992), but this line of literature has not addressed collusion
at either stage.
The objective of our research is to analyze the potential for tacit collusion at both the product
choice and quantity decision(s) stages. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms make strategic decisions over which of
the available differentiated product(s) they will produce and in the second stage make their respec-
tive output decisions. To accomplish our objective, we ﬁrst extend a commonly used differentiated
products model developed by Bowley (1924) by relaxing the long running assumption that a ﬁnite set
of differentiated products are uniquely produced by each ﬁrm (i.e. Dixit, 1979; Häckner, 2000; Singh
& Vives, 1984; Symeonidis, 2002). By doing so, the market segmentation decisions of ﬁrms can be
endogenized and allow ﬁrms to produce perfect overlapping products.
We further consider instances in which the ﬁrms are able to only partially or fully collude across
both decision stages. When ﬁrms are unable to collude across both product space and output, we
ﬁnd the dominant strategy between symmetric ﬁrms during product selection, regardless of product
substitutability, is for both ﬁrms to conglomerate and produce multiple products in contrast to the
ﬁndings of earlier work by Shaked and Sutton (1990). Furthermore, the required discount factor that
supports collusive market segmentation is strictly decreasing in product substitutability.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd under partial collusion that the required minimum discount factor that sup-
ports output collusion alone given ex ante non-cooperative multiproduct (conglomeration) is strictly
less than that required for collusive market segmentation alone. Additionally, the required minimum
discount factor is constant; a result contrary to both horizontally and vertically differentiated product
modeling thus far. We  also ﬁnd the required minimum discount factor that supports output collusion
under non-cooperative market segmentation is monotonically increasing; a result that is consistent
with price collusion in Chang’s (1991) and Ross’s (1992) horizontally differentiated product models, as
well as the Cournot setting of Deneckere (1983). However, this result is in contrast to a Bertrand setting
where Deneckere (1983) and Häckner (1994) found a non-monotonic and monotonically decreasing
result, respectively.
Finally, when ﬁrms are able to consider full collusion across both decision stages, we  ﬁnd that
the required minimum discount factor that supports both collusive market segmentation and output
is monotonically decreasing as products become closer substitutes. The minimum required discount
factor in this setting is less than that required for collusive market segmentation alone but greater
than that required for output collusion alone. Therefore, if ﬁrms are found to collusively segment the
market, output collusion is a logical progression of the ﬁrms’ decision making.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature.
Section 3 describes the economic model, the solutions of Nash and sub-game perfect equilibria. Finally,
in Section 4 we present our conclusions.
2 Bernheim and Winston (1990) analyze the incentive constraints of collusive pricing strategies of ﬁrms experiencing mul-
timarket contact holding product-ﬁrm space, product differentiation and geographic locations constant. Symeonidis (2002)
analyzes the impact of exogenous changes in the number of ﬁrms, number of products produced by both ﬁrms and product
substitutability on the likelihood of collusion via comparative statics.
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2. Literature
Though the product differentiation literature is voluminous, we  discuss only that which we believe
is most relevant to our analysis. There are several popular linear models of aggregate demand for
horizontally differentiated products. An intensively used model was developed by Hotelling (1929). It
is often assumed that there are two ﬁrms, each ﬁrm produces only one product at constant marginal
cost, demand is inelastic, and the differentiated commodity is uniformly distributed.
Using this spatial competition framework with respect to pricing strategies, Chang (1991) examined
the relationship between the degree of product substitutability and the required discount factor to
sustain collusion. Chang (1991) concluded the relationship is monotonically increasing; as products
become closer substitutes, the required discount factor which sustains price collusion increases.
Based on a vertical differentiation model, Häckner (1994) contradicts the results of Chang (1991)
and found a negative relationship between the degree of product differentiation and sustainability of
price collusion. The argument is that when products are remote substitutes, the ﬁrm producing the
high quality product is quite well off even without collusion and is less likely to collude. Therefore, the
discount factor required to support collusion is relatively small since the low quality ﬁrm would agree
to collude at a low discount factor. For the horizontally differentiated products, the author argued the
opposite result can be obtained and concluded that theory cannot predict when products contain both
attributes.
Häckner (1995) extends Chang’s (1991) paper by considering the endogenous choice of Bertrand
duopoly competitors in selecting horizontally differentiated products as a means to facilitate collusion
in an inﬁnitely repeated game. The author ﬁnds that the ﬁrms’ ability to maintain collusive pricing
increases by choosing an optimal degree of differentiation given varying required discount factors.
For sufﬁciently high discount factors, ﬁrms chose intermediate degree of product substitutability.
For sufﬁciently low discount factors, ﬁrms increase the differentiation of their products to maintain
collusion.
The Bowley (1924) model has been a popular linear aggregate demand model, where the utility
function is assumed to be quadratic and strictly concave (i.e. Häckner, 2000; Mukherjee, 2005; Singh
& Vives, 1984; Symeonidis, 2002). Singh and Vives (1984) analyze the duality of Bertrand and Cournot
competition in a differentiated symmetric duopoly. The authors concluded that if ﬁrms can precommit
to either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the dominant strategy is for ﬁrms to choose Cournot when
products are substitute goods and Bertrand for complements. However, Bertrand competition yielded
higher total welfare in equilibrium, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements.
Häckner (2000) extended Singh and Vives (1984) to include n > 2 heterogeneous ﬁrms.
The heterogeneity is in regards to vertical product differentiation on quality and substituta-
bility/complementarity of products. The author found that the dichotomy between Bertrand and
Cournot competition is sensitive to the duopoly assumption and the results of Singh and Vives (1984)
cannot be generalized to the n-ﬁrm speciﬁcation if quality differences between ﬁrms are large and
products are complements.
More recently, Mukherjee (2005) compared both Cournot and Bertrand competition over substi-
tute goods when there is free entry. The author demonstrates that welfare is higher under Cournot
competition for sufﬁciently differentiated products, but it is higher yet under Bertrand if the products
are close substitutes, a result on par with Singh and Vives (1984). The reason being is that increases
in Cournot competition result in a larger market size which overtakes the generally more competitive
Bertrand competition.
An early inﬁnitely repeated game ‘grim’ strategy collusion analysis by Deneckere (1983) found that
the stability of collusion for differentiated substitute goods is monotonically decreasing with product
homogeneity in Cournot setting but non-monotonic in Bertrand setting. Following the work of Singh
and Vives (1984), Ross (1992) analyzed the relationship between vertical and horizontal differentiation
and the sustainability of collusion between symmetric ﬁrms under Bertrand competition based on
the quadratic utility model. Assuming ﬁrms’ marginal costs are identical and set equal to zero, a
non-monotonic relationship between the degree of substitution and collusion stability can obtain, a
result consistent with that of Deneckere (1983) under price competition. The reason being is greater
homogeneity/heterogeneity can reduce cartel stability by increasing the incentive to defect, but when
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the products are moderate substitute’s collusion becomes easier. Under horizontal differentiation,
however, Ross (1992) found the stability of price collusion monotonically decreases with product
homogeneity.
Symeonidis (2002) analyzes cartel stability in an inﬁnitely repeated game among multiproduct
ﬁrms in a horizontally differentiated market under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In the
model, it is assumed that the number of ﬁrms in the market and the number of varieties that each ﬁrm
produces are both exogenous. Via comparative statics, the author generally ﬁnds that an increase in
the number of varieties produced by each ﬁrm makes collusion more difﬁcult to sustain, except for
the case where the number of ﬁrms is small and the products are close substitutes.
Shaked and Sutton (1990) study a two-stage game where Bertrand duopolists consider product
expansion within ﬁrm, the competition effects from the expansion and entry deterrence in horizontally
(Hotelling) and vertically differentiated (Bowley) products. The authors generally ﬁnd in a simulta-
neous game as two products become closer substitutes, the value of product expansion decreases
in relation to the increase in competition for more similar products. The analysis demonstrates a
multitude of potential Nash equilibria, but none include the ﬁrms producing both products.
Fraja (1992) extends Shaked and Sutton’s (1990) work by explicitly considering economies of scope
and its impacts on which of two  products are produced by two ﬁrms. Furthermore, the author utilizes a
variant of the Bowley model that allows for changing intercepts and slopes of the respective demands
as a function of the quantities produced of each product. The author ﬁnds that Cournot competition
in the second stage results in a full range of product combination (market structure) possibilities.
However, Bertrand competition results in only a pure monopoly of both products or a pure monopoly
by each ﬁrm over each product. The main ﬁnding is that a decrease in economies of scope and an
increase in product substitutability induce a shortening of the product line.
Dobson and Waterson (1996) expand the vertical differentiated Bowley demand model of Shaked
and Sutton (1990) and Fraja (1992) to include consumer’s intrinsic value of consumption from a speciﬁc
ﬁrm, entry costs, economies of scope, as well as Cournot competitors. They generally ﬁnd that the
added dimensions result in an array of Nash equilibria in a simultaneous product choice game that
depend on the parameters of the model. Among other results, they ﬁnd that for intense intra-product
rivalry (close substitutes) ﬁrms produce only one of the two  products and for close complements ﬁrms
produce both products. They suggest that when two ﬁrms optimally produce both products, collusion
is beneﬁcial. Asymmetric duopoly equilibria (one ﬁrm produces both products while the rival produces
one) are not observed under a symmetric cost assumption. Economies of scope increase the incentive
(likelihood) of observing both ﬁrms producing both products.
Doraszelski and Gaganska (2006) study the determinants of ﬁrms’ market segmentation strategies
under spatial competition model assuming ﬁrms compete in prices. A two-stage game is considered.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms simultaneous decide on their produce offerings; in the second stage, price com-
petition takes place. In this framework, they considered both the utility increases for some consumers
(due to increased ﬁt) and the utility decreases for others (due to increased misﬁt) as a result of the
ﬁrms’ offering a targeted product instead of general purpose products. Their results suggest that in
addition to the degree of ﬁt and misﬁt, the intensity of competition and the ﬁxed cost of offering an
additional product determine ﬁrms’ market segmentation strategies.
3. Economic model
We  ﬁrst identify two stages of ﬁrm decision making. In the ﬁrst stage, two ﬁrms consider which
of two differentiated products to produce in the market, A and/or B. In stage two, ﬁrms consider their
output choices for each product produced.
As noted in Bernheim and Winston (1990), the deﬁnition of the markets may  be identiﬁed by
product and/or geographic delineations. For simplicity, we  describe the markets unidimensionally
as products. Our modeling framework is most applicable for analyzing a ﬁnite set of substitutable
commodities, such as meats or sweeteners. For example, consumers view differentiated products such
as beef, pork, chicken and ﬁsh as imperfect substitutes of a larger class of meat protein (Kinnucan, Xiao,
Hsia, & Jackson, 1997).
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We  utilize the quadratic consumer utility function developed by Bowley (1924). One of the
strengths of the Bowley is that we need not distinguish between horizontal and vertical differen-
tiation, since the model can be used in both situations (Martin, 2002). One weakness of the model,
however, is that the addition of products necessarily increases the market size, a phenomena not
always present in real markets. However, when the product mix  is ﬁxed and has long been supplied
by at least one seller, as in commodities, the weakness is not as apparent.
In this section, we ﬁrst provide three scenarios resulting in partial collusion at only the ﬁrst stage
product space or only at the second stage output decision. A potential cause of partial collusion is that
though ﬁrms are long lived, different levels of management and their goals may  change over time. The
ﬁnal scenario we consider is that of complete collusion from backward induction across both decision
stages within a trading period. We  ﬁnish this section with a comparison and discussion of the required
minimum discount factors across product substitutability to maintain each type of collusion, partial
and complete.
3.1. Scenario 1 – partial collusion, product space only
The ﬁrst scenario we consider is when ﬁrm product line decisions are made by long lived upper
management who delegate output decisions to lower level management with short time horizons.
In such a case, upper management of each ﬁrm considers product space collusion, each believing
their rival’s lower level management will competitively choose output. In this scenario, ﬁrms only
consider taking three courses of actions: produce product A only, produce B only, or produce both
products A and B. Rivals are assumed able to perfectly observe the product choices of rival ﬁrms at no
cost.
To begin, the Bowley quadratic and strictly concave utility function of the representative con-
sumer for the two primary products is U(qA, qB) = a(qA + qB) − (1/2)b(q2A + 2qAqB + q2B) + m.  The
quantities demanded of the two differentiated products in the market are qA and qB, m represents
all other goods with price normalized to 1, and  represents the degree of substitution of the two
products. We  consider only substitutes goods as we  rely on the ﬁndings of Singh and Vives (1984)
and others that the dominant strategy for symmetric quality duopoly is to choose quantity when
products are substitutes, as such, 0 ≤  ≤ 1. As  → 0, the two products are increasingly independent
indicating multiproduct ﬁrms in this spectrum of products are more akin to conglomerates. As  → 1,
the two products become closer substitutes indicating the multiproduct ﬁrms experience increas-
ing intra-ﬁrm (or intra-product) rivalry. Finally, although the utility function can be generalized by
allowing the positive parameters a and b to vary across products, for clarity we  do not pursue the
generalization.
From the quadratic utility, the corresponding inverse demand functions for each product are
pA = a − b(qA + qB) and pB = a − b(qA + qB). A basic assumption of the model is that ﬁrms are unable
to identify consumer groups per se, thus reducing the strategic choices of the ﬁrms to product space.
We extend Bowley’s (1924) model by assuming each ﬁrm has the option of producing any combina-
tion of the products within the available product space. That is to say, each ﬁrm can produce product
A, product B, or both products, and the quantity produced of each product is based on the result-
ing competition and substitutability of the products. The aggregate quantities of A and B produced
are qA = qA,1 + qA,2 > 0 and qB = qB,1 + qB,2 > 0, where qA,i and qB,i are the quantities of product A and B
produced by ﬁrm i = 1,2. The prices paid by consumers for products A and B are pA and pB.
We assume entry costs and economies of scope are symmetric across ﬁrms and products, and
without a loss in generality we set them equal to 0. As will become apparent, our model does not require
signiﬁcant economies of scope to result in competitive multiproduct (conglomerate) market structure
as was required in Fraja (1992) and Dobson and Waterson (1996). Variable costs are generated from
ﬁxed proportion technology for products A and B, are constant and for simplicity assumed symmetric.
Therefore, cA = cB = c, where the costs of production c < a for positive production. Admittedly, it cannot
generally be assumed that production costs of differentiated products are symmetric and leave this
as a future extension.
We consider four general cases which map  to the nine simultaneous game payoff proﬁles sum-
marized in Table 1. The payoffs depicted in Table 1 are static product choice conditional on ﬁrms
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Table 1
First stage product choice conditional on Cournot output competition.
Firm 1 Firm 2
A B A&B
A (a−c)
2
9b ,
(a−c)2
9b
(a−c)2
b(2+)2
, (a−c)
2
b(2+)2
(a−c)2
9b ,
(13−5)(a−c)2
36b(1+)
B (a−c)
2
b(2+)2
, (a−c)
2
b(2+)2
(a−c)2
9b ,
(a−c)2
9b
(a−c)2
9b ,
(13−5)(a−c)2
36b(1+)
A&B (13−5)(a−c)
2
36b(1+) ,
(a−c)2
9b
(13−5)(a−c)2
36b(1+) ,
(a−c)2
9b
2(a−c)2
9b(1+) ,
2(a−c)2
9b(1+)
symmetrically choosing Cournot output into the unforeseeable future. Detailed solutions to the payoffs
depicted in Table 1 and Nash equilibrium are provided in Appendix 1.
In the ﬁrst case, let each ﬁrm consider producing only product A. When both ﬁrms produce only
A qB = 0, the game degenerates to a classic Cournot duopoly where the representative ﬁrm’s objective
function is Max
qA,i |qA,2
A,j = [a − b(qA,i + qA,j) − c]qA,i, i /= j. The resulting payoffs are depicted in the top
left and middle center cells of Table 1.
In the second case, each ﬁrm considers producing each product separately, thus the game degene-
rates to the cases analyzed in past research that uses a Bowley model. Let Firm 1 consider producing
only A and ﬁrm 2 producing only B. In this case, the objective functions for the two  ﬁrms are
Max
qA,1|qB,2
A,1 = [a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c]qA,1 and Max
qB,2|qA,1
B,2 = [a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c]qB,2, where each
ﬁrm’s payoffs are depicted in the middle left and middle top cells of Table 1.
In the third case, we begin extending the assumption that ﬁrms are uniquely identiﬁed by their
product. Let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while ﬁrm 2 considers producing only A.
The ﬁrms objective functions are now Max
qA,1,qB,1|qA,2
A&B,1 = [a − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + qB,1) − c]qA,1 + [a −
b((qA,1 + qA,2) + qB,1) − c]qB,1 and Max
qA,2|qA,1,qB,1
A,2 = [a − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + qB,1) − c]qA,2 resulting in
the respective ﬁrm payoffs depicted in the bottom left, top right, middle left and right cells of Table 1.
In the fourth case, let each ﬁrm consider producing both products. The representative ﬁrm’s objec-
tive function i = 1,2 is therefore Max
qA,i,qB,i |qA,j,qB,j
A&B,i = [a − b(qA,i + qA,j + (qB,i + qB,j)) − c]qA,i + [a −
b((qA,i + qA,j) + qB,i + qB,j) − c]qB,i, i /= j, where each ﬁrm’s total payoffs are depicted in the bottom
right cell of Table 1.
Given the matrix of Cournot outcomes depicted in Table 1, we prove in Appendix 1 that pro-
ducing both products is a unilateral strictly dominant strategy. Therefore, the unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium {A&B | Cournot, A&B | Cournot}. Interestingly, these results hold for multiproduct
ﬁrm structure producing close substitutes or, as classically deﬁned, conglomeration across weak and
independent products.
We  now solve for the conditions for upper management to maintain tacitly collusive market seg-
mentation as a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE), conditional on both ﬁrms
maintaining Cournot output. We  assume in an inﬁnitely repeated game ﬁrms follow the standard
‘grim’ or ‘trigger’ strategy. Applicable to our setting, such a strategy dictates that each ﬁrm chooses
to abstain from producing the same product as their rival in any given trading period. If either ﬁrm
enters their product market in one period, the other ﬁrm punishes by permanently entering their
rival’s market.
For simplicity we will denote c as the collusive market segmentation payoff, d as the defection
payoff and N is the Nash equilibrium payoff. Under a ‘grim’ strategy the following condition must be
satisﬁed for sustainable tacitly collusive market segmentation (MS) is ı ≥ ıMS = ((d − c)/(d − N)),
where ı and ıMS is the required and minimum discount factor to maintain tacitly collusive
market segmentation. Because of the symmetric outcomes of the model we ignore ﬁrm iden-
tiﬁers. By substituting the corresponding payoffs from Table 1 into the collusion condition we
have ı ≥ ıMS = ((52 + 12 + 16)/(5(2 + )2)). Notice that the minimum discount factor is a function
of the substitutability parameter  and, due to ﬁrm and product symmetries, is independent of
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Fig. 1. Comparison of minimum required discount factor to maintain collusion as a function of product substitutability.
cost and the slope (elasticity) of demand. Because there are two possible market segmentations,
{A, B} and {B, A}, we have the two pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria SPNE1 = {A,
B ; ı ≥ ((52 + 12 + 16)/(5(2 + )2))} and SPNE2 = {B, A ; ı ≥ ((52 + 12  + 16)/(5(2 + )2))}. Given 0 ≤  < 1
in the relevant game, ıMS lies in the interval ıMS ∈ (11/15, 4/5]. These results are graphically depicted
in Fig. 1.
Given there are two SPNE, coordination at the initial stage of market segmentation could real-
istically be a “noisy” process. For simplicity, we  will assume ﬁrms’ are able to coordinate by
making ex ante public statements and ﬁrm 1 always chooses product A ﬁrst. In pure strategies,
(∂ıMS/∂) = ((8( − 1))/(5(2 + )3)) < 0 ∀ 0 ≤  < 1 and is equal to zero otherwise. This result indicates
the minimum discount factor that supports market segmentation is monotonically decreasing as the
degree of substitution of the two  goods increases. That is to say, as the goods become closer substitutes,
it is easier for the ﬁrms to collude and segment the market. Alternatively, as goods become increasingly
independent, multiproduct production (conglomeration) is more likely.
Finally, it is quite apparent that each ﬁrm would like to produce A&B while the other produces only
A or B. The payoff (((13 − 5)(a − c)2)/(36b(1 + ))) in the top right and bottom left cells of Table 1 are
the highest possible payoff in the game. Therefore, if a ﬁrst mover i = 1, 2 were able to create an entry
cost εi ≥ | {A & B, B} j − | {A & B, A & B} j i /= j, as in Fraja (1992) and Dobson and Waterson (1996),
the ﬁrst mover could preempt entry rendering collusive market segmentation a moot point. In such a
game, other antitrust issues of how ﬁrms erect the barriers to entry become focal.
3.2. Partial collusion, output only
The second and third scenarios we consider are when making product line adjustments or entering
new markets is a long process so that the primary focus of upper (and hence lower) management
is on output competition. In such a case, ﬁrms/management may  only consider output collusion.
Though there are nine potential product combinations between the two  ﬁrms, we will focus on the
Nash (multiproduct production (conglomeration)) and collusive (market segmentation) equilibria to
provide the ﬁrst stage initial conditions for our analysis of output collusion.
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Table 2
Second stage output choice conditional on prior market segmentation.
Firm 1 produces product A Firm 2 produces product B
Monopoly output Cournot output
Monopoly output (a−c)
2
4b(1+) ,
(a−c)2
4b(1+)
(a−c)2(2−(−2))
8b(1+)2
, (a−c)
2(2+)2
16b(1+)2
Cournot output (a−c)
2(2+)2
16b(1+)2
, (a−c)
2(2−(−2))
8b(1+)2
(a−c)2
b(2+)2
, (a−c)
2
b(2+)2
3.2.1. Scenario 2 – ex ante market segmentation
In scenario two, we assume ﬁrms are producing separate products with no plans of altering their
product mix. This state may  arise due to (i) an existing competitive advantage, (ii) a locational con-
straint, or (iii) the ﬁrm’s ability to tacitly collude over product space prior to foreseeing their capabilities
of output collusion. Assuming ﬁrms are producing only one product, the payoffs from the collusive
equilibrium {A, B} from Table 1 is the starting point for second stage tacit output collusion. Table 2
summarizes the payoff matrices from output decisions. Detailed solutions to the payoffs depicted in
Table 2 and Nash equilibrium are provided in Appendix 2.
Firms now consider their collusive joint proﬁt maximization objective function
Max
qA,1,qB,2
A,1 + B,2 = (a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c)qA,1 + (a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c)qB,2. This is the discrim-
inating monopolist’s objective function. The resulting collusive outcomes are provided in the upper
left cell and the defection payoffs are provided in the upper left and lower right cells in Table 2. We
subsequently prove in Appendix 2 that there is a unilateral incentive to deviate from the collusive
output resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
Given the relevant payoffs, the required minimum discount factor for output col-
lusion under ex ante market segmentation (EMS) following a ‘grim’ strategy requires
ı ≥ ıEMS = ((2 + )2/(8 + (8 + ))). Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
SPNEEMS = {qA,1 = ((a − c)/(2b(1 + ))) = qB,2 ; ı ≥ ((2 + )2/(8 + (8 + )))}. Given 0 <  < 1, ıEMS lies in
the interval ıEMS ∈ (1/2, 9/17). Comparing collusive market segmentation and non-cooperative output
to non-cooperative market segmentation and output collusion we ﬁnd the following relationship,
ıEMS < ıMS ∀ 0 <  < 1. Thus, collusion is easier to obtain when markets are initially segmented. These
relationships are graphically depicted in Fig. 1.
In pure strategies, the ﬁrst order condition, (∂ıEMS/∂) = ((4(2 + ))/(8 + (8 + ))2) > 0 ∀0 <  ≤ 1 and
zero otherwise, reveals increasing product substitutability monotonically increases the required dis-
count factor to maintain collusion. This result is in stark contrast to our previous results regarding
collusion in product space alone.
This scenario most closely aligns with past collusion literature. Our result using the Bowley model
is consistent with price collusion in horizontally differentiated product models where consumer tastes
are heterogeneous and demand is piecewise linear (Chang, 1991; Ross, 1992). Additionally, we ﬁnd
similar results under quantity collusion assuming a piecewise demand function (Deneckere, 1983).
However, our result is in contrast to the non-monotonic relationship found when assuming price col-
lusion and a quadratic utility function (Ross, 1992). Furthermore, our result is in contrast to Häckner
(1994) who found that increasing product substitutability monotonically decreases the required dis-
count factor to maintain collusion. An important reason for the difference between our result and
Häckner (1994) lies in the fact that Häckner’s model explicitly includes a continuous quality vari-
able absent from the Bowley model. Häckner also considers cost asymmetries resulting from quality
differentiation, while we assume cost is symmetric across products and ﬁrms.
3.2.2. Scenario 3 – ex ante multiproduct production (conglomerate)
In the third scenario, we assume that conglomerate ﬁrms are producing both products. This state
may  arise due to (i) a lack of a competitive advantage, (ii) no locational constraint, or (iii) falling prey
to the competitive pressures to produce both products before foreseeing their capabilities of output
collusion. When ﬁrms are producing both products, the payoffs from the Nash equilibrium {A&B,
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Table 3
Second stage output choice conditional on prior competitive multiproduct (conglomeration).
Firm 1 produces A&B Firm 2 produces A&B
Monopoly output Cournot output
Monopoly output (a−c)
2
4b(1+) ,
(a−c)2
4b(1+)
3(a−c)2
16b(1+) ,
9(a−c)2
32b(1+)
Cournot output 9(a−c)
2
32b(1+) ,
3(a−c)2
16b(1+)
2(a−c)2
9b(1+) ,
2(a−c)2
9b(1+)
A&B} in Table 1 is the starting point for output collusion. Table 3 summarizes the payoff matrices from
output decisions. Detailed solutions to the payoffs depicted in Table 3 are provided in Appendix 3.
In this scenario, ﬁrms now consider their collusive joint proﬁt maximization objective function
across both products
Max
qA,1,qB,1,qA,2,qB,2
A&B,1 + A&B,2 = [a − c − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + (qB,1 + qB,2))]qA,1 + [a − c − b(qB,1 +
qB,2 + (qA,1 + qA,2))]qB,1 + [a − c − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + (qB,1 + qB,2))]qA,2 + [a − c − b(qB,1 + qB,2 +
(qA,1 + qA,2))]qB,2. The collusive payoffs are provided in the upper left cell and the defection payoffs
are provided in the upper left and lower right cells in Table 2. We  prove in Appendix 3 that there is a
unilateral incentive to deviate from joint collusive output resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
The required discount factor for output collusion under ex ante multiproduct (conglomeration)
(EMP) following a ‘grim’ strategy is constant ı ≥ ıEMP = 9/17. Because there is only one Nash equilib-
rium from the ﬁrst stage game, there is only one pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the
subsequent second stage game of SPNEEMP = {A & B, A & B ; ı ≥ 9/17}. Comparing market segmentation
alone and output collusion under either ex ante multiproduct (conglomeration) or market segmenta-
tion we ﬁnd that ıEMS < ıEMP < ıMS ∀ 0 <  < 1. Thus, output collusion alone is easier to obtain regardless
of whether markets are initially segmented. These relationships are graphically depicted in Fig. 1.
In pure strategies notice that minimum required discount factor is independent of , a seemingly
odd result. The reasons the degree of the substitutability of the products no longer impact the mini-
mum  required discount factor to maintain collusion are (1) consumers are entirely trapped and cannot
ﬂee higher prices, and (2) given ﬁrms are already producing both products, they need not be concerned
about the value of defection (product expansion) relative to changes in competition for more simi-
lar/dissimilar products. Interestingly, there is no distinction between conglomerate ﬁrms competing
for near independent goods and multiproduct ﬁrms producing close substitutes ability to collude.
3.3. Scenario 4 – complete collusion across product space and output
The previous partial collusive equilibria were based on the assumptions that product space and
output decisions may  be carried out by various levels of management, each with varying time horizons.
If however, management decisions of the ﬁrm are fully integrated and long lived, then the ﬁrm is able
to fully foresee the beneﬁts from collusion across both decision stages, further assuming there are no
constraints as to competitive advantage or location.
In regards to observability of defection, we  consider the case where ﬁrms make product space
decision in stage one, but either do not make them publically known until placed in the market,
or even if observable, the rival waits to verify product placement in one period before defection is
subsequently punished. In such a setting, the two-stage decision process reduces to a single game of
paired choices (product space and quantity) played once each period.
We discuss three possible defection cases. The ﬁrst is where one ﬁrm is observed to defect only on
the output dimension, which we have already addressed in scenario two  above. The second is when
one ﬁrm defects only on the product dimension. However, given we assume the rival will not punish
defection on product space without committed production leaves us with the third case, defection in
paired choices (product space and quantity). Therefore, veriﬁable defection in product space cannot
occur without defection in output, especially in the market entered. To maintain collusion across both
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Table 4
Joint product space and output choices.
Firm 1 Firm 2
Produce product B at
monopoly output
Produce products {A&B} at
Cournot output
Produce product a at monopoly output (a−c)
2
4b(1+) ,
(a−c)2
4b(1+)
(a−c)2(1+2)
8b(1+)2
, (a−c)
2(5+4)
16b(1+)2
Produce products {A&B} at Cournot output (a−c)2(5+4)
16b(1+)2
, (a−c)
2(1+2)
8b(1+)2
2(a−c)2
9b(1+) ,
2(a−c)2
9b(1+)
product space and output, the within period backward induction process across decision stages by
ﬁrms must consider credible punishments, and optimal defection strategies.
In regards to defection, we ﬁnd that the defector has two  strategies available contingent upon the
range of product substitutability. The ﬁrst defection strategy takes place only at the output deci-
sion stage resulting in a defection payoff of (((a  − c)2(2 + )2)/(16b(1 + )2)), (payoff located in the
upper/lower right/left cells in Table 2, scenario 2). The second defection strategy is across both decision
stages. Appendix 4 provides the derivation of defection per period payoffs for Table 4. We  ﬁnd when
the colluding ﬁrm produces the monopoly output within its believed segmented market, results in a
set of defection and collusion payoffs of defection,i = (((a  − c)2(5 + 4))/(16b(1 + )2))i /= j. If the defector
is rational, the ﬁrm will compare these two payoffs and choose an optimal one time defection.
We now compare the two defection payoffs and note that  is the pri-
mary variable determining the relative size of the defection payoffs. We  ﬁnd that
(((a − c)2(5 + 4))/(16b(1 + )2)) > (((a  − c)2(2 + )2)/(16b(1 + )2)) ∀ 0 ≤  < 1. Therefore, for the excep-
tion of perfect substitutes we ﬁnd the optimal defection includes both entering the rival’s previously
segmented market and producing Cournot output. In Table 4 we  provide the respective defection
payoffs in the lower right and upper left cells.
Next we consider credible punishment. If a ﬁrm is observed to cheat in only the second stage, it
was the case in scenario 2 that the optimal punishment by the rival in the next period is to produce its
Cournot output in only its segmented product market. However, under full collusion the second stage
subgame Nash equilibrium does not represent a credible punishment, but rather the paired strategies
{A&B, Cournot; A&B, Cournot}. Therefore, the only credible punishment for veriﬁable defection in
product space and output results in symmetric payoffs of ((2(a − c)2)/(9b(1 + ))) (bottom right payoffs
in Table 1, scenario 1).
Table 4 summarizes the relevant payoffs of the game played each period. The collusive payoffs
from scenario 2 constitute full collusion payoffs in the upper left cell. The credible punishment just
discussed constitutes full defection in the bottom right cell. We  prove in Appendix 4 that there is a
unilateral incentive to deviate from maintaining market segmentation and monopoly output resulting
in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium {A&B, Cournot; A&B, Cournot}.
Following a ‘grim’ strategy, the required discount factor for both market segmentation and out-
put collusion requires ı ≥ ıFull = (9/(13 + 4)). Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
SPNE = {A, B, qA,1 = ((a − c)/(2b(1 + ))) = qB,2 ; ı ≥ (9/(13 + 4))}. Given 0 ≤  < 1, ıFull lies in the interval[
9/13, 9/17
)
.
By comparing all partial collusion scenarios to full collusion we  ﬁnd that
ıEMS < ıEMP < ıFull < ıMS ∀ 0 <  < 1. Thus, output collusion alone is easier to obtain than coordi-
nating over product space. Taking the ﬁrst order condition, (∂ıFull/∂) = − (36/(13 + 4)2) < 0 ∀ 0 ≤  < 1,
reveals that increasing product substitutability monotonically decreases the required discount factor
to maintain complete collusion. These results are graphically represented in Fig. 1.
3.4. Summary of the minimum required discount factors for partial and complete collusion
Given our modeling framework, it appears that product space collusion is more difﬁcult to
attain than output collusion. Overall, as long as product space is major consideration of collusion,
closer substitutes stabilizes collusion. Alternatively, as long as output is the focal point of collusion,
closer substitutes weakly destabilizes collusion. However, output, rather than market segmentation,
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collusion is generally easier to obtain and more so as product markets become increasingly weaker
substitutes.
It is important to note that output collusion among multiproduct (conglomerate) ﬁrms results in the
same payoffs as output collusion after market segmentation. To achieve the same level of collusion,
and hence proﬁt, ﬁrms/management that ﬁrst segment the market then later consider restricting
quantity have two hurdles of coordination to overcome in the long run. However, if ﬁrms/management
have a high ‘enough’ discount factor to collusively segment the market in the ﬁrst place, they would
necessarily be able to collude over output at a later date. On the other hand, if ﬁrms/management have
low ‘enough’ discount factor and cannot initially segment the market, the resulting multiproduct
(conglomerate) ﬁrms would experience nearly the same level of difﬁculty to collude in output as
segmented ﬁrms.
4. Conclusions
By accounting for a two-stage decision process, we were able to evaluate the impact of the
ﬁrms’ ability to collusively segment a differentiated product market, an important issue for antitrust
agencies. Our ﬁrst important ﬁndings is that under partial collusion, i) collusive product market
segmentation is unlikely to occur due to the value of entry, and ii) multiproduct competition (con-
glomeration) and output collusion is more likely to occur than collusive product market segmentation.
Secondly, when ﬁrms are able to consider collusion over both product space and output, maintaining
market segmentation is more likely to occur as products become closer substitutes. Lastly, if ﬁrms
are found to have collusively segmented the product market, but not output, the impacts are not as
severe as with output collusion. However, output collusion is a natural progression if ﬁrms are able to
coordinate over product space.
Given the output collusive payoffs are the same post market segmentation and multiproduct (con-
glomeration) market structure, even ﬁrms with sufﬁciently high discount factors to initially segment
the market may  want to consider the overall ease of collusion. For instance, segmented industries
must monitor entry and output competition, as well as consumer perceptions of the differentiabil-
ity of their products. Though we ﬁnd output collusion is more likely after market segmentation than
not, under more realistic informational assumptions our results suggest collusion may  be more likely
among multiproduct (conglomerate) ﬁrms. For instance, ﬁrms need not be concerned about entry, as
their rival is already in the market, and need not be concerned about adequately estimating the con-
sumers’ view of the differentiability of their products. Therefore, monitoring costs would more likely
be lower in the case of a conglomerate industry. Consequently, periodic distortions in the market,
changes in consumer preferences and/or imperfections in monitoring that may  lead to competitive
disagreements that are more likely overcame if the ﬁrms are able to focus on one rather than two
product dimensions.
In relation to the literature, we ﬁnd that producing both products can be a symmetric and
unique Nash equilibrium without requiring signiﬁcant entry costs and economies of scope (Dobson
& Waterson, 1996; Fraja, 1992), and for the exception of perfect substitutes, is independent of the
degree of substitutability. These results are in stark contrast with earlier two-stage Bertrand models
by Shaked and Sutton (1990) where multiple product mix  equilibria are found but ﬁrms never produce
both products for the exception of complements (Shaked & Sutton, 1990). The discrepancy is due to
the Cournot assumption in our framework. Under Bertrand–Nash competition, the prices would fall
to marginal cost where ﬁrms will not produce both products.
Our results under ex ante market segmentation are consistent with the ﬁndings of horizontally
differentiated products and Bertrand competitors analyzed by Chang (1991) and Ross (1992). However,
this result is inconsistent with Ross’s (1992) non-monotonic result based on the quadratic utility model
and Häckner’s (1994) analysis on a vertical differentiation model. One reason being is that ﬁrms must
ﬁrst overcome the competitive pressure to product both products in the ﬁrst stage. More interestingly,
if ﬁrms are unable to segment the market in the ﬁrst stage, the results indicate that the stability of
collusion is independent of product substitutability for conglomerates. The reason being is that product
substitutability is only an intra-ﬁrm competition concern leaving only aggregate output as the target
for collusion.
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Finally, our modeling approach is easily extended in obvious and much needed ways. For instance,
the assumption of symmetric production costs for each product should be relaxed. For example in the
meat processing industry, beef is signiﬁcantly more expensive to process than chicken, thus altering
the incentives of the high cost ﬁrm to refrain from entering the low cost industry. Interestingly, if
one or the other product is more proﬁtable due to asymmetries in the size of each market, demand
elasticity’s and/or production costs, our intuition is that for a ﬁrm to be willing to continue producing
only the less proﬁtable product would require further assumptions about entry costs, product expertise
or overt (collusive) compensation. Furthermore, an extension of our modeling framework to analyze
multiproduct mergers could consider both economies of scope and increases in the inelasticity of
residual aggregate demand when ﬁrms produce a wider range of complimentary/substitute products
(Bailey & Friedlaender, 1982; Hausman, Leonard, & Zona, 1994).
Appendix 1. Scenario 1 – product space collusion with ex post Cournot output
Case 1. Let each ﬁrm consider producing only product A. When both ﬁrms produce only A
qB = 0, the game degenerates to a classic duopoly where the representative ﬁrm’s objective func-
tion is Max
qA,i |qA,2
A,j = [a − b(qA,i + qA,j) − c]qA,i, i /= j. By doing so, the system of reaction functions of
each ﬁrm are qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qA,2/2) and qA,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qA,1/2), where the optimal quantity
for each ﬁrm is q∗A,1 = ((a − c)/3b) = q∗A,2. Therefore, under Cournot competition, each ﬁrm earns
A,1 = ((a − c)2/9b) = A,2. Similarly, when both ﬁrm produce only B, qA = 0 and q∗B,1 = ((a − c)/3b) =
q∗B,2, resulting in B,1 = ((a − c)2/9b) = B,2. These payoffs are depicted in the top left and middle center
cells of Table 1.3
Case 2. Let each ﬁrm considers producing each product separately, thus the game degenerates
to the cases analyzed in past research that uses a Bowley model. Let ﬁrm 1 consider producing
only A and ﬁrm 2 producing only B. In this case, the objective functions for the two  ﬁrms are
Max
qA,1|qB,2
A,1 = [a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c]qA,1 and Max
qB,2|qA,1
B,2 = [a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c]qB,2 resulting in
the inter-ﬁrm reaction functions, qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qB,2/2) and qB,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qA,1/2). The
optimal quantities for ﬁrm 1 and 2 of product A and B is q∗A,1 = ((a − c)/(b(2 + ))) = q∗B,2. There-
fore, under Cournot competition, each ﬁrm earns A,1 = ((a − c)2/(b(2 + )2)) = B,2 and conversely,
B,1 = ((a − c)2/(b(2 + )2)) = A,2. These payoffs are depicted in the middle left and middle top cells
of Table 1.4
Case 3. We  begin extending the assumption that ﬁrms are uniquely identiﬁed by their prod-
uct. Let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while ﬁrm 2 considers producing only A.
The ﬁrms objective functions are now Max
qA,1,qB,1|qA,2
A&B,1 = [a − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + qB,1) − c]qA,1 + [a −
b((qA,1 + qA,2) + qB,1) − c]qB,1 and Max
qA,2|qA,1,qB,1
A,2 = [a − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + qB,1) − c]qA,2, which result
in the system of intra- and inter-ﬁrm reaction functions qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqA,2 + 2bqB,1)/2b),
qB,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((2bqA,1 + bqA,2)/2b) and qA,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqA,1 + bqB,1)/2b). The optimal
quantities of each product for ﬁrm 1 are q∗A,1 = (((2 − )(a − c))/(6b(1 + ))) and q∗B,1 = ((a − c)/(2b(1 +
))), while for ﬁrm 2 q∗A,2 = ((a − c)/3b). Therefore, under Cournot competition the total payoff for ﬁrm
1 is A&B,1 = (((13 − 5)(a − c)2)/(36b(1 + ))) and for ﬁrm 2 is A,2 = ((a − c)2/9b), the same holding true
3 The second order derivatives for the proﬁt functions are both −2b, which is negative since b is positive. Therefore, the
second order conditions are satisﬁed.
4 Again, the second order conditions are satisﬁed since the second order derivatives for the proﬁt functions of both ﬁrms are
−2b,  which is negative.
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for various similar relative product positions. These payoffs are depicted in the bottom left, top right,
middle left and right cells of Table 1.5
Case 4. Let each ﬁrm consider producing both products. The representative ﬁrm’s objective function
i = 1,2 is therefore Max
qA,i,qB,i |qA,j,qB,j
A&B,i = [a − b(qA,i + qA,j + (qB,i + qB,j)) − c]qA,i + [a − b((qA,i +
qA,j) + qB,i + qB,j) − c]qB,i i /= j, which results in the system of intra- and inter-ﬁrm reaction functions
qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqA,2 + 2bqB,1 + bqB,2)/2b), qB,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqB,2 + 2bqA,1 + bqA,2)/2b),
qA,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((abqA,1 + bqB,1 + 2bqB,2)/2b) and qB,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqB,1 + bqA,1 + 2bqA,2)/2b).
The optimal quantities for both ﬁrms are q∗A,i = q∗B,i = ((a − c)/(3b(1 + ))) = q∗A,j = q∗B,j . Therefore,
under Cournot competition, each ﬁrm’s total payoff is A&B,i = ((2(a − c)2)/(9b(1 + ))) = A&B,j. These
payoffs are depicted in the bottom right cell of Table 1.6
Equilibrium: Based on the matrix of Cournot outcomes across product proﬁles depicted in Table 1,
several features of the market segmentation game can now be discussed. First, when A and B are
perfect substitutes ( = 1), all payoffs are equal and the problem degenerates to the classic Cournot
game between two ﬁrms producing a homogenous good. Secondly, denoting by the conditional choice
payoffs in Table 1 as |{choice ﬁrm 1, choice ﬁrm 2}, we ﬁnd from ﬁrm 2’s perspective that | {A,
A} < | {A, B} < | {A, A & B}, | {B, B} < | {B, A} < | {B, A & B}, and | {A & B, A} = | {A & B, B} < | {A & B,
A & B} ∀0 ≤  < 1. Firm 1 has same incentive to defect to multiproduct production. Therefore producing
both products is a unilateral strictly dominant strategy, resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium {A&B | Cournot, A&B | Cournot}.
Appendix 2. Scenario 2 – output collusion under ex ante market segmentation
Firms now consider their collusive joint proﬁt maximization objective function Max
qA,1,qB,2
A,1 +
B,2 = (a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c)qA,1 + (a − b(qA,1 + qB,2) − c)qB,2. This is the discriminating monopo-
list’s objective function. First order conditions result in the system of inter-ﬁrm reaction functions
qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − qB,2 and qB,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − qA,1. The optimal level of output by Firm 1 and 2
is q∗A,1 = ((a − c)/(2b(1 + ))) = q∗B,2. By substitution of the optimal levels of output into the objec-
tive function results in total joint proﬁts of A,1 + B,2 = ((a − c)2/(2b(1 + ))). Therefore, due to ﬁrm
and demand symmetry results in equal market shares and each ﬁrm’s collusive earnings are
collusion,1 = ((a − c)2/(4b(1 + ))) = collusion,2. These payoffs are provided in the upper left cell in Table 2.
By substitution of either ﬁrm’s collusive output quantity into the rival’s reaction function results in
the defector’s output of q∗defection,i = (((a − c)(2 + ))/(4b(1 + ))) ∀ i = 1, 2. Substituting the defector
and colluder’s outputs into each ﬁrms objective function results in the defector and colluder earnings of
defection,i = (((a  − c)2(2 + )2)/(16b(1 + )2)) > (((a − c)2(2 − ( − 2)))/(8b(1 + )2)) = collusion,j i /= j and
∀0 <  < 1. These relative payoffs are provided in the upper right and lower left cells in Table 2. The
lower right payoffs are the Cournot outcomes of a segmented market from Table 1.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in Table 2 between the colluder’s payoff when their rival defects
illustrates that collusion,i < Cournot,j ∀ 0 ≤  < 1. Because Cournot,i > collusion,i ∀ 0 ≤  < 1 when j defects,
defection in the static game is symmetrically preferred. Therefore, producing Cournot output is a
unilateral strictly dominant strategy resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under ex
ante market segmentation of {Cournot, Cournot}.
5 The Hessian matrix for the proﬁt function of the ﬁrm that produces both products is
[
−2b −2b
−2b −2b
]
, which is negative
deﬁnite since |H1| = −2b < 0 and |H2|=4b2(1 − 2) > 0 given that b > 0 and 0 ≤  < 1, and the second order derivative for proﬁt
function of the ﬁrm that produce a single product is -2b. Therefore, the second order conditions are satisﬁed. |H2| = 0 when  = 1,
which is a special case that we discuss later.
6 Again, the Hessian matrices for both ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are
[
−2b −2b
−2b −2b
]
, which is negative deﬁnite, therefore, the
second order conditions are satisﬁed.
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Appendix 3. Scenario 3 – output collusion under ex ante multiproduct (conglomerate)
production
By taking the ﬁrst order condition of the joint proﬁt maximization objective function Max
qA,1,qB,1,qA,2,qB,2
A&B,1 + A&B,2 = [a − c − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + (qB,1 + qB,2))]qA,1 + [a − c − b(qB,1 + qB,2 + (qA,1 +
qA,2))]qB,1 + [a − c − b(qA,1 + qA,2 + (qB,1 + qB,2))]qA,2 + [a − c − b(qB,1 + qB,2 + (qA,1 + qA,2))]qB,2
results in the system of inter- and intra-ﬁrm reaction functions qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qA,2 + (qB,1 + qB,2)),
qB,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qB,2 + (qA,1 + qA,2)), qA,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − (qA,1 + (qB,1 + qB,2)) and qB,2 = ((a − c)/2b)
− (qB,1 + (qA,1 + qA,2)). Because of ﬁrm symmetry resulting in equal market shares the optimal collu-
sive quantities for both ﬁrms and each product are q∗A,1 = q∗B,1 = ((a − c)/(4b(1 + ))) = q∗A,2 = q∗B,2.
Substitution of the optimal levels of output into the objective function results in total joint proﬁts
A&B,1 + A&B,2 = ((a − c)2/(2b(1 + ))). Therefore, each ﬁrm’s equal market share of the collusive
earnings are collusion,1 = ((a − c)2/(4b(1 + ))) = collusion,2. These payoffs are located in the upper left
cell of Table 3.
By substitution of either ﬁrm’s collusive output quantity into their rivals Cournot
intra- and inter-ﬁrm reaction functions from the ﬁrst stage results in the defectors out-
put of q∗defection,i = ((3(a − c))/(8b(1 + ))) i /= j. By substitution of collusion and defection
outputs into each ﬁrms objective function results in the defector/colluder earnings of
defection,i = ((9(a − c)2)/(32b(1 + ))) > ((3(a − c)2)/(16b(1 + ))) = collusion,ji /= j. These relative payoffs
are provided in the upper right and lower left cells in Table 3. The lower right payoffs are the Cournot
outcomes of a multiproduct market from Table 1.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in Table 3 between symmetric collusion and Cournot we have
collusion,i > Cournot,i ∀ i = 1, 2. Again, output collusion in both products Pareto dominates multiproduct
(conglomerate) Cournot. Comparison of the colluder’s payoff when their rival defects illustrates that
collusion,i < Cournot,j ∀0 ≤  < 1. Because Cournot,i > collusion,i ∀ 0 ≤  < 1 when j defects, defection in the
static game is symmetrically preferred. Therefore, producing Cournot output is a unilateral strictly
dominant strategy resulting in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under ex ante multiproduct
(conglomerate) Nash equilibrium of {Cournot, Cournot}.
Appendix 4. Scenario 4 – collusion across both product space and output
Following scenario 1, case 3, let Firm 1 consider producing both A and B, while ﬁrm
2 considers producing only B. The ﬁrms objective functions would be Max
qA,1,qB,1|qB,2
A&B,1 =
[a − b(qA,1 + (qB,1 + qB,2)) − c]qA,1 + [a − b(qA,1 + qB,1 + qB,2) − c]qB,1 and Max
qB,2|qA,1,qB,1
B,2 = [a −
b(qA,1 + qB,1 + qB,2) − c]qB,2, which would result in the system of intra- and inter-ﬁrm reac-
tion functions qA,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((2bqB,1 + bqB,2)/2b), qB,1 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((2bqA,1 + bqB,2)/2b) and
qB,2 = ((a − c)/2b) − ((bqA,1 + bqB,1)/2b). However, under complete collusion ﬁrm 2 continues produc-
ing monopoly output of product B, q∗B,2 = ((a − c)/4b(1 + )), under the belief that ﬁrm 1 is producing
only product A at the joint proﬁt maximizing output (Appendix 2, scenery 2). If ﬁrm 1 defects and
produces product B while ﬁrm 2 continues to produce the monopoly output of B, ﬁrm 1’s optimal quan-
tities of each product are q∗A,1 = ((a − c)/(2b(1 + ))) and q∗B,1 = ((a − c)/(4b(1 + ))). Substituting the
defector and colluder’s outputs into each ﬁrms objective function results in defector and colluder earn-
ings of defection,1 = ((a − c)2(5 + 4)/(16b(1 + )2)) > (((a  − c)2(1 + 2))/8b(1 + )2) = collusion,2 ∀ 0 ≤  < 1.
The same relative payoffs hold true from defection by ﬁrm 2 if ﬁrm 1 maintains collusion. These
payoffs are depicted in the top right and bottom left cells of Table 4.
Equilibrium: Comparing the payoffs in Table 4 the colluder’s payoff when their rival defects
illustrates that collusion,i < defection,j ∀ 0 ≤  < 1. Because Cournot,i > collusion,i ∀ 0 ≤  < 1 when j defects,
defection in the static game is symmetrically preferred. Therefore, producing Cournot output and
entering the rivals market is a unilateral strictly dominant strategy resulting in the unique Nash
equilibrium of {A&B, Cournot; A&B, Cournot}.
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